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L Introduction
In the summer of 1996, a state trial court applied the Uniform Partner-
ship Act (UPA)' to a national law firm's closure of a branch office. In
Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft,2 the court ordered an old-line
Wall Street firm to pay more than $3.5 million in damages and attorneys'
fees, including $500,000 in punitive damages, for violating its fiduciary duty
by wrongfully expelling a partner in its Palm Beach office. The
Cadwalader opinion is disappointing because it does not address the funda-
mental issue suggested by the facts, which is whether there was a rightful
dissolution and reformation of an at-will law partnership. This article will
explore that issue and the extent to which situations like Cadwalader are
analyzed differently under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).5
II. The Cadwalader Scenario: Under the UPA
A. The Facts
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft (Cadwalader), which represents itself
as the oldest law partnership in the United States, "having been founded in
1792, .6 is a national law firm with its primary office in New York City. In
1989, Cadwalader was trying to broaden the practice out of its Palm Beach
office, which had been operating at a loss, by adding a litigation practice.
Accordingly, plaintiff Jim Beasley became a partner in 1989 by "lateral
transfer" from a Florida practice in which he had proven himself to be both
an extraordinary rainmaker and a skilled litigator.
Although the Palm Beach office showed increased profits for the next
two years, it also suffered from internal discord.7 In 1993, the office oper-
1. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT (1914), 6 U.L.A. 238 (1995) [hereinafter UPA]. The
original Uniform Partnership Act was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1914.
2. No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL 438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996).
3. See Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Tax Costs and Attorneys' Fees, Beasley v. Cad-
walader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," at 10-11 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 17, 1996).
4. For an analysis that is far more sympathetic with the court's approach, see Allan W.
Vestal, "Assume a Rather Large Boat. . .: The Mess We Have Made of Partnership Law,
54 WASH. & LEE L. Rlv. 487 (1997).
5. REVsED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994), 6 U.L.A. 1 (1995) [hereinafter RUPA].
See generally ROBERT W. HILLMAN Er AL., GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS
UNDER THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1996).
6. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996).
7. The court said the internal discord was "associated primarily with the personality
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ated at a loss. At the same time, the value of the firm dropped by $11,000
per share. In May of 1994, the Management Committee ordered computer
analyses of the financial impact of partial and of complete closure of the
Palm Beach office. A strategic planning committee was created to devise a
long-term plan for expanding the Palm Beach office and improving morale.
This committee never met because it was overtaken by events.
In 1994, the value of the firm decreased by an additional $15,000 per
share. Several of the younger, more productive partners made it clear that
they would leave if the firm did not make changes quickly. In response to
those demands, "Project Right Size" was born:
In short, "Project Right Size" was aimed at identifying less produc-
tive partners for elimination from the partnership. While it is clear that
the Palm Beach office was of concern to the Management Committee
before "Project Right Size" reared its head .... ultimately the closing of
the Palm Beach office became integrated into "Project Right Size", with
the common purpose being to improve compensation to the remaining
partners and to retain the disgruntled more productive partners ....
[N]umerous computer runs were generated for the management com-
mittee... analyzing the financial impact of terminating from ten to thirty
partners!8
These financial analyses "were treated as confidential by the management
committee and were not shared with most of the other partners. "9 However,
they were shared with at least one of "the young Turks."
Throughout this period, Beasley himself was dissatisfied. He met
secretly with Cadwalader associates about leaving with him. One of the
reasons for his dissatisfaction was that the firm's other relationships con-
flicted him out of cases he wanted to litigate. Judge Cook specifically found
that he "suffered no loss of future income or benefits" because of his expul-
sion from the firm.
Judge Cook stated that the "watershed" of Project Right Size was a
"clandestine" day-long management committee meeting held on August 7,
1994, at the Marriott Hotel in Manhattan. Prior to the meeting, management
committee members were asked to submit lists of less productive partners to
be considered for possible termination. The Marriott meeting identified
flaws of the other senior partner in the office." Id. The court continued: "Mhis partner,
while being extraordinarily productive and skilled, was also extraordinarily disruptive,
exhibiting unpredictable temper tantrums which the witnesses have described as 'rippling
through the office' and creating severe morale problems." Id. In addition, Beasley's secretary
complained of sexual harassment by two other partners. Id.
8. Id. at *2.
9. Id. at *2 n.2.
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seventeen partners for expulsion, including all of the Florida partners. Later
that month, the management committee voted to close the Florida office. At
least some committee members neither read the partnership agreement to
determine what, if anything, it said about expulsion nor consulted the finn
experts on partnership law. On August 30, one day before it was announced
at a general partnership meeting, the Palm Beach partners were told that
their office would be closed effective the end of December.'0 On October 3,
the management committee circulated its plan to reduce the compensation of
fourteen partners in other offices. On October 12, the fim membership, by
a 67-12 vote, endorsed the management committee's action reducing the
number of partners."
Mr. Beasley filed suit on November 9, 1994, and the next day the firm
ousted him by letter from the firm offices. Judge Cook concluded that
Cadwalader had wronged Mr. Beasley and, in a series of orders, directed the
firm to pay him more than $3.5 million in damages and attorneys' fees,
including $500,000 in punitive damages.
B. Judge Cook's Analysis
Cadwalader's partnership agreement did not discuss the expulsion of a
partner. According to Judge Cook, the lack of an expulsion provision meant
that "if Beasley was expelled, the partnership agreement was breached,"
whereas if Beasley voluntarily withdrew, "there was no breach."'1 Judge
10. The management committee said that it would consider a transfer of certain partners
to New York, but agreed with Beasley that such a transfer would be impractical in his case.
The court found that the firm did not make him a good faith offer to continue in its New York
or Washington offices.
First .... Beasley and the other Florida partners had been designated for termina-
tion, not transfer .... Second .... Beasley's practice was in Florida, not in New
York or Washington. He had been in South Florida for twenty-two years... and
his client base was in Florida. His value . . . as a New York or Washington
partner was greatly diminished, in that his rainmaking abilities would be severely
impaired if not lost completely. Moreover, the firm was in the process of expel-
ling partners in both New York and Washington because of low productivity.
Obviously, it would be senseless to laterally transfer a partner without business to
either of those offices.
Id. at *3.
11. Id. "The management committee action in terminating partners was not without
opposition within the partnership, but ultimately it was endorsed by a sixty-seven to twelve
vote of the partners in mid-October (the Moss resolution)." Id.
12. Id. The court rejected two arguments by the firm that Beasley had voluntarily with-
drawn. The first was that Beasley voluntarily withdrew by failing to accept an offer of contin-
uing partnership in either the New York City office or the Washington, D.C. office. The
880
CADWALADER, RUPA AND FDUCIARYDUTY
Cook said: "While it is clear that the management committee had the power
to close a branch office as part of its overall managerial authority, it is
equally clear that the management committee did not have the right to expel
a partner."13 Thus, he equated the management decision to close an office
without relocating all partners with an expulsion and he said that the power
to close an office does not include the right to expel.
Judge Cook appears to have been saying much more than that the ex-
pulsion was wrong because it was unauthorized. He appears to conclude that
the expulsion was wrong because it was improperly motivated and that the
improper motivation supports an award of punitive damages.14 He rejected
the argument that a management committee breaches no fiduciary duty when
it closes a branch office for financial reasons. Indeed, the consideration of
the best financial interest of the majority of the partners was what Judge
Cook apparently found inappropriate. To the statement of the Co-chair of
the management committee that "life is not made up of love, it is made up
of fear and greed and money - how much do you get paid in large mea-
sure," Judge Cook responded: "While life in the market place may well be
made up of fear, greed and money, life in a partnership is not so com-
posed." 5 He said that "the ouster of Beasley and the other partners was
done for the express purpose of producing greater profits for the remaining
partners."16 There was a "clandestine plan to wrongfully expel some part-
court said that the offer to transfer to Washington or New York "was not a good faith offer
of continued partnership." Id. In addition, the court said that, even if it had been a good faith
offer, Beasley's rejection of it "was appropriate and did not constitute a voluntary withdrawal
from the firm." Id. at *4. Second, the court rejected the argument that Beasley had volun-
tarily withdrawn by filing suit. The court said that "so long as the suit for dissolution is not
frivolous, it cannot constitute a voluntary withdrawal from the partnership." Id. It also said
that New York partnership law contemplates suits among partners. Id.; cf. RUPA § 405.
13. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *4.
14. Professor Vestal reaches the same conclusion about the breadth of Judge Cook's
holding. "Judge Cook found the breach of fiduciary duty, apparently based on [the claim] that
the motivation for the expulsion was the financial gain of the remaining partners." Vestal,
supra note 4, at 491. He emphasizes that "Beasley based his punitive damages claim on
Cadwalader's breach of fiduciary duty." Id. at 493. After reviewing what he considers the
"almost adolescent bravado" of the insurgent partners, whom he characterizes as "witless
thugs," Professor Vestal declares Judge Cook's leap to be "analysis" that has his approval:
"Judge Cook's core analysis in Cadwalader is solid." Id. at 495-97.
15. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *7.
16. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *6. The court relied on this factor to distinguish
Cadwalader from another fiduciary duty case involving partnerships. See Day v. Sidley &
Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 993-94 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d
1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court in Day stated: "No court has recognized a fiduciary duty
to disclose [information regarding changes in the internal structure of the firm], the conceal-
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (1997)
ners for the financial gain of other partners. " 17 He noted that the manage-
ment committee consulted neither the partnership agreement nor the firm's
partnership experts to probe the rights of the Palm Beach partners. "If
Beasley had dirt under his fingernails, [Cadwalader] was up to its' [sic] elbows
in the dung heap."18 It was "a gross breach of fiduciary duty for some
partners to throw others overboard for the expediency of increased profits."1 9
C. Expulsion Pursuant to Agreement
The UPA provides that dissolution is caused "[bly the expulsion of any
partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a power con-
ferred by the agreement between the partners. "' There is authority for the
proposition that the expulsion agreement21 may be oral rather than written.'
ment of which does not produce any profit for the offending partners nor. any financial loss for
the partnership as a whole .... " Id. at 993; see infra text accompanying notes 53-64.
17. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *6. Beasley himself had been planning to leave
the firm and had secretly spoken with three Cadwalader associates about leaving with him.
The court said that, even if his secret conversations breached his fiduciary duty, it would be
insufficient to defeat his claim. "It would not be equitable to allow Beasley's actions in this
regard to stand as a defense to Cadwalader's much more egregious conduct." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *7. The court listed the following facts relevant to its punitive damage
determination:
1. The partnership agreement contains no clause authorizing the expulsion of a
partner from the firm.
2. In addition to the clear language of the partnership agreement, the management
committee had Mr. Robertson's legal memorandum which told them that they did not
have the authority to expel partners.
3. Management committee members testified that they had not even read the
partnership agreement to determine what it said about expelling partners prior to
determining to take such action.
4. [Cadwalader] is a partnership of highly skilled attorneys and includes experts on
partnership law. These experts were not consulted before partners were expelled.
5. The expulsion was for the express purpose of increasing the compensation
available to the other partners.
Id.
20. UPA § 31(1)(d).
21. Under the UPA, special rules apply to a dissolution caused by expulsion pursuant
to the partnership agreement. See UPA § 38(1). The UPA states: "[I]f dissolution is caused
by expulsion of a partner, bona fide under the partnership agreement and if the expelled
partner is discharged from all partnership liabilities, either by payment or agreement under
section 36(2), he shall receive in cash only the net amount due him from the partnership." Id.
For a discussion of RUPA's expulsion rules, see HILLmAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 198-204.
22. See Frank v. R.A. Pickens & Son Co., 572 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Ark. 1973) (relying
on oral agreement that one partner "had exclusive control over the terms of admission and
expulsion of the partners"). In another case, the court admitted parole evidence offered by
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There is also authority stating that the partnership need not provide any
particular process to the partner it is expelling - it is permissible to have a
"guillotine" expulsion with no notice or hearing.'
The precise contours of the "bona fide" limitation are unclear. One
court has said that "good faith" has a very limited meaning in the expulsion
context:
Where the... partners... deem it necessary to expel a partner under a no
cause expulsion clause in a partnership agreement freely negotiated and
entered into, the expelling partners act in "good faith" regardless of motiva-
tion if that act does not cause a wrongful withholding of money or property
legally due the expelled partner at the time he is expelled.
2'
Under this analysis, a court will not require the expelling partners to justify
an expulsion.' Although an expulsion is not actionable simply because it is
motivated by self-interest,' it is in bad faith if it causes a forfeiture or other
an expelled partner because the written partnership agreement contained "no true integration
clause." Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 439 n.I (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); cf.
Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating
that "the parties intent that a written agreement be integrated 'may be manifested even in the
absence of an explicit statement to that effect'" (citation omitted)). The court must consider
the intent of the parties, which includes a consideration of "the circumstances surrounding the
partnership agreement." Id.
23. In Holman v. Coie, the court allowed a summary "guillotine approach," rather than
"a more diplomatic approach," to the expulsion of law partners. Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d
515, 524 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). The court refused to infer or imply requirements of notice,
reasons or an opportunity to be heard, noting that "additional requirements should not be
added to unambiguous expulsion provisions." Id. at 522. The Lawlis court also discussed the
guillotine method, noting:
At the time the partners negotiated their contract, it is apparent they believed.. . the
"guillotine method" of involuntary severance, that is, no notice or hearing, only a
severance vote to terminate a partner involuntarily need be taken, would be in the
best interests of the partnership. Their intent was to provide a simple, practical, and
above all, a speedy method of separating a partner from the firm, if that ever became
necessary for any reason. We find no fault with that approach to severance.
Lawlis, 562 N.E.2d at 442. See generally ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER
MOBILrrY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS
§ 5.3 (1996) (hereinafter LAWYER MOBILITY).
24. Lawlis, 562 N.E.2d at 442-43.
25. See id. at 443. The court explained that to hold otherwise "would be engrafting a
'for cause' requirement upon [the] agreement when such was not the intent of the parties at
the time they entered into their agreement. Mere lapse of time ... does not alter that initial
intent." Id.
26. See Gill v. Mallory, 80 N.Y.S.2d 155, 157 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948).
The plaintiffs' contention is that the majority decision was made selfishly and there-
fore not in good faith. We do not think that it was the purpose of the agreement to
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breach of public policy.2Y Courts will monitor whether reliance on clauses
that permit expulsion without justification is cloaking opportunistic
behavior.'
It appears that the only argument in Cadwalader that there was an
agreement permitting expulsion was that the management committee had
both the power and the right to expel. In particular, Cadwalader argued that
the management committee's power to set compensation is tantamount to an
expulsion provision because compensation could be set at zero or at other
levels that would force departures. Judge Cook rejected this argument
because "[t]here is no express reference to expulsion and a reasonable person
reading this provision would not draw the conclusion that the management
committee had been granted the power to expel a partner from the firm. "29
Because Judge Cook found that the agreement did not authorize expul-
sions, he understandably concluded that the partnership had not rightfully
expelled Mr. Beasley pursuant to agreement. His analysis should have gone
further, however, to consider whether the conduct that failed to qualify as
a rightful expulsion pursuant to agreement nevertheless qualified as a rightful
dissolution by express will.
offer such an issue to be litigated whenever this clause in the agreement was
availed of by a majority in interest. The purpose was to minimize litigation, not
to create new issues to be tried in addition to those which would ordinarily be
attendant upon dissolution.
Id.; see Ho&an, 522 P.2d at 522 (quoting same language with approval); see also HUILMAN,
supra note 23, § 5.3.3.
27. Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576 (N.Y. 1977).
28. In Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, the court endorsed the principle that "partners owe
one another a duty of good faith in the context of expulsion, even where the partnership
agreement permits expulsion without cause." Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239,
245 (11. App. Ct. 1996). The court concluded that a triable issue had been presented because
the facts alleged
raise an inference that [the partner] was expelled solely because he persisted in
invoking rights belonging to him under the partnership agreement and that the
reasons advanced by the firm were pretextual. Regardless of the discretion
conferred upon partners under a partnership agreement, this does not abrogate
their high duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing in the execution of such
discretion.
Id. at 246; see also Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App. 1995, writ granted).
29. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "Al," 1996 WL
449247, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1996). But see Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d
436, 441, 444 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that partner who was "subject to the virtually absolute,
unilateral control of the Management Committee" was an employee for purposes of both the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
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D. The Right to Dissolve and Reform
Under the UPA, expulsion by agreement is simply one way to dissolve
a partnership. Even if the closing of the West Palm Beach office was not an
effective expulsion, it was an effective dissolution by express will if any
partner's association with the firm was ending.'o Because of the express will
of at least one partner, the partners experienced a "change in the relation"
such that they "ceased to be associated in the carrying on ... of the busi-
ness."31 The partnership relationship that had included all the Palm Beach
partners contracted in scope and continued for the limited purpose of wind-
ing up. At the same time, a new partnership was formed without the Palm
Beach partners who were not relocated to other offices. 2
The question is whether the dissolution by express will was rightful or
wrongful.33 The rule has always been that, in a partnership at will, each
partner has not merely the power, but also the right to dissolve at any time. 4
This is true even if the partnership agreement provides that a dissolution will
not cause a liquidation of the business. Unless there was an agreement to
30. Some authority suggests that partners may contract away not only the right to
dissolve, but also the power to dissolve. See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,
413 (N.Y. 1989) ("[U]nless there is an agreement to the contrary, withdrawal of a partner
constitutes dissolution of the law partnership." (citation omitted)). Some states have modified
the UPA to permit partners to contract away dissolution. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-42-601,
4-42-603 (Michie 1996); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15031 (West 1991); see also Heller, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 347 n.6. However, the proper interpretation of the UPA, when not specially
amended, is that a "dissolution" takes place whenever a partner ceases to be associated in the
carrying on of the business, even if the partners have agreed not to liquidate the business.
UPA § 31. A major problem with the concept of dissolution under the UPA is confusion
between the causes of dissolution and its consequences. When a partner leaves a firm, a
number of things must happen. The partner's liability for the actions of other partners must
be contracted and extinguished. The agency power of the other partners to bind the partner
must be contracted and extinguished. The partner's liability for unfinished business must
be contracted and extinguished. The partner must be paid the partner's equity in the partner-
ship. The UPA provisions making these things happen are activated by, and only by, a
dissolution. See HLLMAN, supra note 23, § 4.3 (describing dissolution as "term of art under
the UPA").
31. UPA § 29.
32. See HILLMAN, supra note 23, § 5.3.2. "The 'firing' of a partner unsupported by
an underlying expulsion agreement is not an expulsion but is a dissolution by express will of
the partners initiating the 'removal' of one of their colleagues." Id.
33. In statutory terms, the question is whether there was a dissolution by "express will"
under UPA § 31(1)(b) (without violation of the partnership agreement because "no definite
term or particular undertaking is specified"), or a dissolution by "express will" under UPA
§ 31(2) (in "contravention" of the partnership agreement and not otherwise authorized by
statute). See UPA § 31.
34. UPA §§ 31(1)(b), 38(1); RUPA § 801(1).
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remain partners for a specific term or undertaking, each Cadwalader partner
had the right to dissolve at any time. Accordingly, any group of partners
had the right to dissolve and to form a new partnership without the others.
The dissolution/reformation analysis applies even if the partnership is
a very large one and even if all but one of the members takes part in the
reformation. One should contrast Judge Cook's interpretation of New York
law with the interpretation of the same law by the New York Court of
Appeals. In Dawson v. White & Case,35 the New York Court of Appeals
addressed a large law firm's dissolution and reformation without a person
who had been a partner for almost twenty years, stating:
"[Alt the heart of the partnership concept" is "the principle that partners
may choose with whom they wish to be associated." In recognition of this
principle, we have held that a partnership agreement may contain a termi-
nation provision or some other mechanism by which to remove a partner.
Absent such a mechanism, however, the removal of a partner can be
accomplished only through dissolution of the firm, defined as a "change
in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associ-
ated in the carrying on... of the business." The White & Case partner-
ship agreement did not contain an express termination provision, and so,
in order to remove Dawson, the partners voted to dissolve the firm and
then to immediately re-form without him.35
The court stated that, while partners are "statutorily empowered to dissolve
the partnership at any time, wrongfully dissolving partners may be liable to
the expelled partner for breach of the partnership agreement when the
partnership is not at will."37
E. At-Will Partnerships and Specific Understandings
Cadwalader appears to have been an at-will partnership, under the
normal use of the term. The term "at-will" is normally defined in the
negative to refer to partners who have not agreed to remain together either
for a fixed term or until a particular undertaking is completed. 8 The term
either can be expressed or inferred from the circumstances.
35. 672 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1996).
36. Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 591-92 (N.Y. 1996) (citations omitted).
Cadwalader may have avoided the dissolution/reformation argument because the partnership
agreement said the firm's New York office building must be sold in the event of dissolution.
37. Id. at 591 n.1 (citations omitted).
38. Although the UPA contains no formal definition of partnership at will, UPA sec-
tion 31(1)(c) refers to a "specified term or particular undertaking." UPA § 31(1)(c); cf.
RUPA § 101(6) (stating "'[p]artnership at will' means a partnership in which the partners have
not agreed to remain partners until the expiration of a definite term or the completion of a
particular undertaking").
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Even if Cadwalader was not a term partnership, the partners argu-
ably made a special and important commitment to make their relationship
work. Mr. Beasley's complaint alleged that the partnership agreement
provided:
The parties to this Agreement mutually pledge to each other their best
efforts to aid each other's professional success and advancement during the
continuance of this partnership, so that each party shall receive from the
others a fair opportunity to use his best talents and faculties to the common
benefit, and shall have an approximate if not complete or perfect compen-
sation for his industry and abilities out of the partnership funds.39
This language arguably supports a heightened degree of fiduciary or other
obligation within the firm. The court in Cadwalader might have resolved the
case by exploring the intent of this language and its application over the
years. Does the language mean that profit motive must be discounted in
light of other values?' Does it mean that the partners pledge extraordinary
efforts to remain associated for as long as possible? Does it mean that
partners are to take extraordinary efforts to overcome internal strife? Does
it mean that guillotine expulsions are inappropriate? Does it mean that
continuing partners pledge extraordinary efforts to relocate partners excluded
from reformations? On the other hand, does the last portion of the quoted
language mean that the partners reject lock-step compensation and embrace
competition among themselves? The most disappointing aspect of Judge
Cook's opinion is that it does not examine the partnership agreement or the
partners' reasonable expectations of their relationship.
F. Post-Dissolution Rights and Duties
Apart from the argument that the Cadwalader partnership agreement
required an extraordinarily high level of loyalty or other obligation among
the partners, the strongest argument in Mr. Beasley's favor is that the firm
violated his post-dissolution rights. When a partnership is dissolved, domi-
nant partners may use their superior knowledge of the firm and their superior
39. Amended Complaint for Dissolution of Partnership, Appointment of a Receiver,
Accounting, and Other Relief, and Demand for Jury Trial at Exhibit A, pp. 41-42, Beasley
v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL 438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
July 23, 1996).
40. Cf. Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Mass. 1995) (involving partnership
that induced lawyer to join partnership claiming his inability to generate business would not
affect his share of firm profits). The court found that this was a tortious misrepresentation by
a founding partner, who had "intended client origination to be the dominant factor for
allocating profit shares when he made his representation to the contrary to the plaintiff." Id.
at 1267.
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position to wrest control over assets, prevent a liquidation of the partnership
business, grab a larger share of the business or its proceeds, or control the
winding up. These are the basic wrongs that are suggested in situations like
Cadwalader.
In a very public way, dominant partners in Cadwalader were contemp-
tuous of the suggestion that the partnership had dissolved and must face the
consequences." It is possible that they wanted to continue claiming that
Cadwalader is the oldest law partnership in the United States, and not simply
a transitory relationship in a long series of dissolutions and reformations. It
is possible that they believed they had contracted away dissolution and its
consequences. It is also possible that they could not grasp that the rules that
apply to small firms also apply to large firms.42 Perhaps they were trying to
play hard ball with the Palm Beach partners. Perhaps they were overly
confident or insufficiently astute.43 Whatever the reasons, their actions
appear to have denied Mr. Beasley his dissolution rights.
The Cadwalader partnership agreement provided that dissolution would
not be caused by the withdrawal or death of any partner, or by any other
event, unless 75% of the remaining partners agreed in writing. Because
"such agreements are in derogation of the common law and the Uniform
Partnership Act," said Judge Cook, they "should be strictly construed and
applied."44 Specifically, a partner who seeks to rely on an anti-dissolution
41. See Amy Stevens, Prestigious Law Firm Gets Sued By a Partner It Would Not Keep,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1994, at Bi. Stevens reported:
Mr. Beasley is asking the... court to liquidate the firm's assets, of which he
wants his share.... John Fritts, co-chair of Cadwalader's management commit-
tee, describes the lawsuit as "frivolous." As to the claim that the partnership has
been dissolved, he says: "That's a bit of foolishness. The partnership is technically
dissolved every time a partner leaves, and nothing happens. It's a paper, legalistic
transaction and has none of the consequences he alludes to."
Id.
42. It is hardly irrational to assume that large partnerships might be subject to different
rules. Cf. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 441, 444 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
"partner" was "employee" for purposes of both Age Discrimination in Employment Act and
Employee Retirement Income Security Act). The court stated: "The characterization of
'partner' was a title that carried no legal significance [and] which could be disclaimed when
convenient to the defendant's management. Simpson and his similarly situated colleagues
were relegated to the position of an employee subject to the virtually absolute, unilateral
control of the Management Committee." Id. at 441.
43. Professor Vestal provides a harsh assessment of the behavior of certain Cadwalader
partners. See Vestal, supra note 4, at 495-96 (discussing "almost adolescent bravado of the
insurgents" and characterizing "insurgents and managing partners" as "witless thugs").
44. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
449247, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. March 29, 1996).
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provision "must operate within the bounds of the agreement."4' An unautho-
rized expulsion is a breach of the agreement, which prevents the expelling
partners from relying on the ant-dissolution provision. It also prevents them
from relying on provisions limiting the amount to be paid to a withdrawing
partner. Judge Cook made all these points in an Order Denying Motions for
Summary Judgment. Although his Final Judgment concluded that there had
been an unauthorized expulsion that breached the partnership agreement, it
contained no discussion of Mr. Beasley's rights as a member of a dissolved
partnership.
If a partnership is at will, absent agreement to the contrary, a partner
in dissolution has four basic dissolution rights. First, a partner has the right
to liquidate the partnership business and apply the proceeds to satisfy liabili-
ties.' s The partner has the right to insist that the partnership account for all
partnership property in this process, including partnership opportunities.
Second, each partner has the right to receive payment in cash for the part-
ner's share of any surplus.47 The partner cannot be forced to accept an in-
kind distribution. Third, each partner has the right to participate in the
process of winding up.' Indeed, if a dissolution is wrongful, an innocent
partner has the right to exclude wrongful dissolvers from the conduct of the
winding up.49 Fourth, each partner has the right to expect bargaining in
good faith.
1. Accounting for Assets and Other Expectations
The UPA provides that a partner "must account to the partnership for
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the
consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the forma-
tion, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its
property."'  On dissolution, a central task is to identify the assets, benefits,
and profits for which the partnership must account. Some assets are easier
to identify and value than others. In law firms, a partner's interest in unfin-
ished business is often an issue. Just as a partner is liable for the completion
45. Id.
46. See UPA § 38(1) (stating "[w]hen dissolution is caused in any way, except in
contravention of the partnership agreement, each partner .... unless otherwise agreed, may
have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay
in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners").
47. See id.; see also RUPA § 807(a) (continuing "in cash" rule).
48. See UPA § 37.
49. See id.
50. UPA § 21(1).
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of unfinished business, the partner also has a right to share in the profits
from that business.
The stereotypical law firm case involves a personal injury law firm that
represents plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis. Shortly before a lengthy and
major case settles or goes to trial, the firm breaks up and the lawyers han-
dling the case leave and take the client with them. The question is who has
the right to share in the division of the contingent fee and in what proportion.
The lawyers handling the case are not permitted to deny their partners the
right to share in the fee. 1
On the other hand, the law is far less clear with respect to many part-
nership breakups. It is not always possible to attribute future income to the
completion of specific matters pending at the time of dissolution. In some
practices, it is easy to characterize future income, even from the same client,
as attributable to new matters.' It may be difficult if not impossible to prove
a reasonable expectation of sharing in these matters.
In Day v. Sidley & Austin, 3 a partner asserted an expectation with
respect to control itself." In Sidley & Austin, the former chairman of Sidley
& Austin's Washington, D.C. office claimed that a merger stripped him of
his office, caused him a loss of income, and humiliated him, all in breach
of the partnership's fiduciary duties. Mr. Day claimed that the firm forced
him to resign, in part because of meetings that were held without him. The
court concluded that there was no remedy for his "diminution in status"
because "he had no vested contractual right to remain the sole chairman."'5
Indeed, there was no legal remedy for him even if the firm had made a
misrepresentation to him about his status after the merger because he "was
51. See Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 636 (D.C. 1990) ("[P]ending cases are
uncompleted transactions requiring winding up after dissolution, and are therefore assets of
the partnership subject to post-dissolution distribution."); Schrempp & Salerno v. Gross, 529
N.W.2d 764, 772 (Neb. 1995) (concluding that fees on cases "are part of the winding up of
firm assets").
52. See HILLMAN, supra note 23, § 4.6.4.
Clients who offer discrete projects requiring substantial legal services over an
extended period of time are less "valuable" to control than clients with business
that departing partners might more easily label "new" at any point. Not only are
the former less likely to offer repeat business for their lawyers, but also the need
to share fees paid upon the completion of their projects lessens or eliminates the
benefits of grabbing this type of client.
Id.
53. 394 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1975).
54. Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 991 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Day
v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 991.
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not deprived of any legal right as a result of his reliance on [the] state-
ment. ,56
The court emphasized Mr. Day's reasonable expectations under the
partnership agreement, stating that he "could not have reasonably believed
that the status of the Washington Office Committee was inviolate and beyond
the scope and operation of the Partnership Agreements."' The partnership
agreements gave the Executive Committee great authority. Mr. Day "had
no contractual right" to maintain his authority over the Washington Office:
"Since he did not have a legal right to maintain his status in the firm, the
conspiracy charge amounts to no more than an internal power sweep, exe-
cuted and permitted under the provisions of the partnership agreement, for
which there is no legal remedy." 8 Similarly, there was no wrongful dissolu-
tion or wrongful ouster because the partnership agreement entrusted an
executive committee with all questions of firm policy, and authorized the
admission and severance of partners by majority vote.59
The court in Sidley & Austin distinguished the structural change caused
by the merger from the kind of appropriation of an opportunity that violates
a fiduciary duty. Even though there were secret merger negotiations, "the
courts have been primarily concerned with partners who make secret profits
at the expense of the partnership,"I such as by surreptitiously purchasing a
building that the partnership might have acquired. Mr. Day's claim was
different:
What plaintiff is alleging in the instant case, however, concerns failure to
reveal information regarding changes in the internal structure of the firm.
No court has recognized a fiduciary duty to disclose this type of informa-
tion, the concealment of which does not produce any profit for the offend-
ing partners nor any financial loss for the partnership as a whole.61
The court did not deny that the merger may have been "profit" motivated.
Despite profit motivation, the merger and consolidation of control was not
an actionable appropriation of an opportunity.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 992.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 657 P.2d 831, 834-35 (Alaska 1982)
(discussing judicial deference to management decisions in context of "involuntary retirement"
provisions in partnership agreement). In Betz, the involuntarily retired partner received
compensation based on an elaborate valuation formula. See id. at 835-36; see also Exxon
Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993).
60. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. at 993.
61. Id. at 993-94.
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Cadwalader argued that, under Sidley & Austin, Mr. Beasley was right-
fully bound by the management committee's decision to close the Palm
Beach office.62 Cadwalader argued that, like Mr. Day, Mr. Beasley had no
"vested right" in a partnership at will. Judge Cook was not very persuasive
when he distinguished Sidley & Austin, stating only that "the ouster of
Beasley and the other partners was done for the express purpose of produc-
ing greater profits for the remaining partners."63
Despite Judge Cook's attempt to distinguish Sidley & Austin, the two
cases are remarkably similar. The difference is in the opinions. The Sidley
& Austin opinion paid particular attention to Mr. Day's status as a partner
at will and to his reasonable expectations under the partnership agreement.
Judge Cook did not. Unlike Judge Cook, the court in Sidley & Austin dis-
tinguished a structural change from an actionable appropriation. Cad-
walader appears to equate an attempt to dissociate from a problematic
partner with an attempt to appropriate a contingent fee.' Unlike the Sidley
& Austin decision, Cadwalader shifts the focus from where it belongs, which
is on the reasonable expectations under the partnership agreement, to the
motivation behind the decision to dissolve. The court suggests that the very
decision to dissolve is actionable if profit is a motivator. In so doing,
Cadwalader represents a problematic addition to the line of cases recogniz-
ing a cause of action for bad faith dissolution of an at-will partnership.
2. Bad Faith Dissolutions of At-Will Partnerships
The major qualification65 to the rule that a partner may rightfully
dissolve an at-will partnership is a line of cases, based on Page v.
62. See Frank v. R.A. Pickens & Son Co., 572 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Ark. 1973); cf. Heller
v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding
that Executive Committee had power to expel without cause).
63. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "Al," 1996 WL
438777, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996).
64. Mr. Beasley analyzes the situation differently. See Stevens, supra note 41, at Bi.
Mr. Beasley says he was fired because his office was "too successful." His lawsuit
claims Cadwalader is "attempting to appropriate millions of dollars in Florida-
generated revenue in an effort to help solve the firm's financial problems." The
51-year-old litigator says he collected an average of $2.3 million a year since 1989,
when he was recruited from another firm.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. See Leff v. Gunter, 658 P.2d 740, 746 (Cal. 1983). The California Supreme Court
in Leff made clear that a partner cannot "immunize" himself from his fiduciary duties owed
to at-will partners by leaving the partnership. Id. Moreover, a partner does not leave simply
by saying "I quit." The partnership relation continues until all partnership affairs are wound
up. RUPA section 802(a) provides that "a partnership continues after dissolution ... for
the purpose of winding up its business." RUPA § 802(a).
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Page,66 stating that a partner may not dissolve an at-will partnership in bad
faith.67 Page states that a partner's right to dissolve is qualified by the
obligation to refrain from a "bad faith" appropriation of "new prosperity
without adequate compensation.61
Page "ivolved an at-wil linen supply partnership that was beginning to
profit after losing money for years. The partnership was heavily indebted
to a corporation owned by a partner we can call Rich. Rich wanted to
terminate the partnership but his partner Poor resisted, pointing to a nearby,
newly-established Air Force base as a source of imminent profit. Rich
sought a declaratory judgment, which the California Supreme Court granted,
stating:
A partner at will is not bound to remain in a partnership, regardless of
whether the business is profitable or unprofitable. A partner may not,
however, by use of adverse pressure "freeze out" a co-partner and appro-
priate the business to his own use. A partner may not dissolve a partner-
ship to gain the benefits of the business for himself, unless hefiuy compen-
sates his co-partner for his share of the prospective business oppor-
tunty .... If [the dissolving partner] acted in bad faith and violated his
fiduciary duties by attempting to appropriate to his own use the new pros-
perity of the partnership without adequate compensation to his co-partner,
the dissolution would be wrongful .... 69
The decision in Page received both praise and criticism.7" The critics
asserted that Page created new and uncertain doctrine that invites too much
66. 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961).
67. See Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961). The termination of a branch office
by the home office of a law firm is analogous to the termination of a franchisee by a franchi-
sor. A minority of franchise termination cases hold that the franchisor-franchisee relationship
can be a fiduciary one that constrains the franchisor from arbitrary termination. See Arnott
v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 1979). "A franchisee, unlike a tenant
pursuing his own interests, builds the goodwill of his own business and the goodwill of the
franchisor. This facet of the relationship has led to the recognition that the franchise relation-
ship imposes a duty upon franchisors not to act arbitrarily in terminating the franchise." Id.
(citations omitted).
68. See Page, 359 P.2d at 44.
69. Page, 359 P.2d at 44-45 (emphasis added). A wrongful dissolver has no right to
control the process of winding up. Compare UPA § 37, with RUPA §§ 602, 803. RUPA
section 602(b) places statutory limits on the definition of wrongful dissociation. RUPA
§ 602(b).
70. Compare Anthony L. Marks, Comment, Barefoot Shoemakers:An Uncompromising
Approach to Policing the Morals of the Marketplace When Law Firms Split Up, 19 ARIz. ST.
L.J 509, 511-12 (1987), with Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent
Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanency of Partnerships and Close
Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1982).
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litigation against dissociated partners who successfully continue in the same
line of business.7
The court in Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen 2 applied Page to the
stereotypical contingent fee case.' The court could have resolved the case
simply by stating that the departing litigators were required to share the fee
from the unfinished business they took with them. It went further, however,
echoing the Page suggestion that a partner may not dissolve an at-will
partnership in bad faith: " The... ruling that as a matter of law a partner
has the absolute right to dissolve a partnership at will without regard to
breach of fiduciary consequences is contrary to the principle that a person
may be estopped from exercising rights in bad faith." 4 On the other hand,
the court in Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman suggests a more narrow definition
of a bad faith dissolution. The court retreated from the Page statement of
a duty to compensate for a "prospective business opportunity." Instead, the
court said that a departing partner "may take for his own account new busi-
ness even when emanating from clients of the dissolved partnership .... ,"'
If Cadwalader means that a dissolution is wrongful if financially moti-
vated, and not merely that an unauthorized expulsion is a breach of fiduciary
duty, then it goes beyond cases like Page and Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman.
It goes further because it has no focus on the appropriation of a particular
business opportunity. 6 Page focused, at a high level of generality that may
be explained by advance declaratory relief, on the opportunity created by the
new Air Force base. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman focused on the appropria-
tion of a contingent fee. The "bad faith" language in these cases may stand
for nothing more than the general proposition that courts will defend their
authority to monitor for appropriated opportunities. Perhaps all the courts
are saying is that they will not relinquish jurisdiction to monitor at-will
relationships. Cadwalader appears to go beyond these cases because it does
71. See Hillman, supra note 70, at 29. Hillman states that whether a new prosperity has
been appropriated cannot be determined at the time of dissolution. The "result contemplated
is harsh and conducive to litigation requiring the retroactive analyses of motives behind
dissolutions." Id. at 31. Hillman continues, "After Page, any partner dissolving such a
partnership runs the risk that if he or she continues in the same line of business the dissolution
will later be found to have involved a wrongful appropriation of the new prosperity of the
business." Id. But see Marks, supra note 70, at 511-12.
72. 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
73. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 187-88 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
74. Id. at 188.
75. Id. at 192.
76. A more narrow interpretation of Cadwalader is that there would have been no
recovery if the partnership agreement had an expulsion clause.
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not discuss an appropriation of partnership business, old or new. The
decision appears to jump straight from a finding of improper motive to a
conclusion that partners breached their fiduciary duties.77
The uncertainty and controversy around the doctrine of bad faith
dissolutions belies the suggestion that the law of partnership breakups was
clear and predictable under the UPA.7s I agree that there are clear "right
results" under the UPA, but Cadwalader is not one of them. Prior to
Cadwalader, there was scant authority for the proposition that a dissolution
and reformation is actionable simply because it is profit motivated.79
Judge Cook's suggestion that law partners are not in a profit-maximiz-
ing business relationship is contrary to the expectation in many firms. It is
true that many lawyers are troubled when the practice of law is viewed as a
business rather than as a profession. To others, the recognition that law is
a business is a precondition to positive change.' In a variety of ways, courts
77. A more narrow interpretation of Cadwiader is that the court jumped from a finding
of an unauthorized expulsion to a breach of fiduciary duty.
78. Professor Hillman is emphatic on the mischief he sees in this line of cases:
The dictum in Page that a "partner may not dissolve a partnership to gain the bene-
fits of the business for himself, unless hefilly compensates his co-partner for his
share of the prospective business opportunity" assumes immense significance if
applied as a principle regulating the relationship between law partners. By adding
the gloss that fiduciary responsibilities, in the form of a good-faith standard, restrain
the decision to dissolve a terminable-at-will law partnership, the court in RMS I
added to the mischief of Page... in ways that it probably never imagined, invited
litigation in connection with partnership dissolutions, and laid the foundation for
chaotic development of dissolution principles as applied to professional associations.
HILLMAN, supra note 23, § 4.6.3.2.
79. Cf. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex. App. 1995, writ
granted) (stating that "within the context of an expulsion, partners must not act in bad faith,
i.e., for self gain"). The court stated, "The issue is not whether the firm or the three partners
[who were especially implicated in the expulsion] in fact gained an additional benefit by
expelling [the partner] from the firm, but whether they intended to gain an additional benefit
by doing so." Id. However, the court applied a de minimis test, concluding that the interest
of the expelled partner "was so small... that the jury could not have reasonably concluded
that the partners' expulsion of [her] was motivated by their desire to acquire her partnership
share." Id. at 604; see also Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 348
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The Heller court concluded, "While his expulsion from the firm
increased all Pillsbury partners' profit shares, given the large number of partners in 1992 and
the fact that [the expelled partner] was earning toward the lower end of the firm's compensa-
tion range, the increase was insubstantial." Id. On the other hand, in a firm of few partners,
the extinguishment of a profit share might receive greater scrutiny. See Starr v. Fordham, 648
N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1995).
80. See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm SW: Why Discard-
ing Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
RaV. 1229 (1995).
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have come to treat law firms as businesses. 81 One leading law firm breakup
case states that the "lifeblood of any partnership contains two essential
ingredients, cash flow and profit."'  More recently, the New York Court of
Appeals stated that law firms can have goodwill apart from the goodwill of
constituent members. Earlier dictum to the contrary "has been superseded
by the economic realities of the contemporary practice of law, illustrated by
attorney advertising, internationalization of law firms, and other professional
developments. "'
The reasonable expectations of the partners should control whether a
dissolution is in bad faith. Partners and firms have very different attitudes
and expectations with respect to the role of profit in their relationship. Some
firms are intensely competitive in purely financial terms. Other firms hold
themselves out as advancing other values. In the latter kind of firm, there
may be a reasonable expectation of a heightened duty toward individual
partners. As mentioned earlier, Cadwalader's partnership agreement sup-
ports an argument that the partners made an extraordinary commitment to
one another. By their agreement, they may have undertaken both the
benefits and the burdens of an extraordinary duty to be mutually supportive,
professionally and financially. The law in this area should enforce such an
agreement, but it should not assume that everyone has made one, nor should
it impose one in the face of contrary expectations.Y Indeed, in some firms
it is arguable that an unprofitable partner has a duty to withdraw. In examin-
ing the reasonable expectations in a particular firm, the behavior of the
partners is as important as their written agreement.5
81. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 159 (Cal. 1993) (stating that "the assertion that
the practice of law is not comparable to a business [is] unpersuasive and unreflective of reality").
82. Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). The court
in Lawlis rejected a partner's claim that he was expelled for "a predatory purpose," even though
there was a "Five Year Plan" intended to "improve our lawyer to partner ratio and improve our
profit per partner to production per lawyer ratio." Id. at 441 n.2. On the other hand, the
expelling partners had worked with the expelled partner in his struggle with alcoholism and had
carried him for a period at reduced compensation.
83. Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 593 (N.Y. 1996).
84. See Heller, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 (rejecting expelled partner's claim of breach of
fiduciary duty). In Heller, the court stated:
mhe Executive Committee expelled [him] because of a loss of trust in him. "The
foundation of a professional relationship is personal confidence and trust. Once a
schism develops, its magnitude may be exaggerated rightfully or wrongfully to the
point of destroying a harmonious accord. When such occurs, an expeditious sever-
ance is desirable. To imply terms not expressed in this partnership agreement frus-
trates the unambiguous language of the agreement and the result contemplated."
Id. (citation omitted).
85. Under RUPA section 101(5), the partnership agreement "means the agreement,
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3. The Powerful Liquidation Right
In a partnership without a continuation agreement,86 the most powerful
right is the right to demand a liquidation of the business. This liquidation
right has long been a right under the UPA, existing in the absence of a
contrary agreement. Although the right is not in doubt, it has been contro-
versial. Critics urged the drafters of RUPA to eliminate the right.' The
critics argued that it gives too much power to minority partners.88 One
opponent argued that it is not necessary to give partners the right to "dyna-
mite" the business because other rights, such as a buyout right, sufficiently
protect the minority partner's interests. Despite these objections, RUPA
retained the liquidation right as the best way to force dominant partners to
the bargaining table. The dominant partners in Cadwalader apparently
refused to acknowledge Mr. Beasley's place at the table.
4. Negotiating in Good Faith
Partners need not be selfless when negotiating a breakup. On the other
hand, they are not permitted to cross the line into bad faith.89 The Fifth
whether written, oral or implied, among the partners concerning the partnership, including
amendments...." RUPA § 101(5).
86. The right to liquidate the business may be contracted away. See UPA § 38(2)(b); see
also supra note 30 and accompanying text (suggesting that, in some jurisdictions, parties may be
able to contract away dissolution itself and not merely its default consequences).
87. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U.
L.Q. 357, 376-77 (1987). Professor Ribstein states:
In general, the U.P.A. approaches partner dissociation by blowing apart the partner-
ship through mandatory dissolution and by giving each partner a right in most
instances to compel liquidation, reserving the more limited buyout right to a few
specific situations. Mandatory dissolution is costly because it may disrupt relation-
ships with and rights of those who are dealing with the firm at the time of dissolu-
tion.... The question... is whether the costs associated with the U.P.A. "dyna-
mite" approach are optimal in light of the benefits of this approach in effecting
dissociation.
Id.
88. Cf. id. at 393-94. Professor Ribstein noted that:
It has been said that a negative aspect of the liquidation right is that it destroys the
going concern value of the firm.... The more important problem with the liquida-
tion right is that, as compared with buyout, the liquidation right makes it easier for
the stronger partner to take over the business.
Id.
89. See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 210-12 (1968) (referring
to "openly abusing the power to break off negotiations" as example of legally proscribed bad
faith).
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Circuit in Exxon Corp. v. Burglin" recently discussed the parameters of
bargaining on breakup. 91 With respect to process, the court emphasized that
"the standard of conduct for a general partner is somewhat lower when
acting in an adversarial relationship" 92 with the other partners, such as
attempting to buy them out: "In this case... Exxon was buying out the
limited partner's interests. It is logical to expect that the relationship would
be somewhat adversarial. The limited partners must have realized that
Exxon would try to secure the best deal it could and that this goal was
adverse to their interests."' The court in Exxon emphasized that it was
addressing a situation involving highly sophisticated parties bargaining with
the assistance of counsel. 94
With respect to substance, the Fifth Circuit said that it will not invali-
date an outcome simply because it is unfavorable to one of the partners:
"Taking advantage of a party's inclination to accept an offer does not trans-
form an unfavorable offer into an unfair one. "' In response to the assertion
by the limited partners that the general partner owed them a "duty to pay a
fair price," the court said that the duty96 had been contracted away:
The duty to pay a fair price was abrogated specifically by... the Partner-
ship Agreement, which provides, "[I]f the General Partner is interested in
acquiring [the] interest, both shall negotiate in good faith in an attempt to
arrive at mutually agreeable terms of purchase." Thus, Exxon was re-
quired only to bargain in good faith; when parties negotiate in good faith
and reach a mutually agreeable purchase price, the result of such a trans-
action cannot be upset by appeal to the concept of an objectively "fair"
price.97
90. 4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993).
91. See Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1299 (5th Cir. 1993).
92. Id. at 1301.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1299.
95. Id. at 1301.
96. See generally Jerman v. O'Leary, 701 P.2d 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). Jerman
involved a general partner who had the right to purchase partnership property without the
consent of any of the limited partners. Moreover, the partnership agreement authorized the
general partner to buy or to sell partnership property "upon terms which the General Partner
shall determine in its sole discretion." Id. at 1209 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the court
said that the general partner was "obliged to pay fair market value for the 25 acres and not to
conceal... any facts... which would bear upon the question of fair market value." Id. at
1210.
97. Exxon, 4 F.3d at 1301 (citations omitted). Indeed, the case is all the more striking
because it involved a claim by the limited partners that information necessary to bargain
effectively had been held from them. The court said that the information had not been
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On the other hand, absent a waiver, there is a duty to pay a fair price.
Courts may view the actions of partners in negotiating the buyout of another
partner as self-dealing, such that they will scrutinize the fairness of the
buyout price. In Starr v. Fordham,98 a law firm's founding partners relied
on their authority under the partnership agreement to determine, prospec-
tively and retrospectively, each partner's share in profits.99 The court said
that the founding partners were self-interested "because the percentage of
profits which they were assigning to the other partners had a direct effect on
their own percentage of the profits.""10 Therefore, the business judgment
rule did not apply and the founding partners had the burden of proving the
fairness of their allocation.'0'
I. RUPA 's Fiduciary Duty and Related Rules
A. Introduction
RUPA's fiduciary duty and related rules reflect more continuity than
change in Cadwalader-type situations. RUPA provides two kinds of rules
that govern the relations among partners. First, RUPA has "default" rules
that apply like default settings on a computer - they apply only if no other
rules, or settings, have been selected by a user, in this case by a user of the
partnership form. Second, RUPA contains "mandatory" rules the parties
may not contract away in their partnership agreement. The mandatory rules
appear in section 103(b). Different duties are subject to different mandatory
minima. Some duties may not be "varied," others may not be "unreasonably
restricted," others may not be "unreasonably reduced," and others may not
be "eliminated. "'02
improperly withheld because the partnership agreement gave the general partner discretion to
classify certain information as confidential and to withhold it. Id. "If the price was not fair,
the limited partners need not have accepted the offer. Exxon did not violate its obligation to
negotiate in good faith by allegedly withholding valuable information that it was under no duty
to disclose." Id.
98. 648 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1995).
99. See Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Mass. 1995).
100. See id. at 1265; see also Smith v. Brown & Jones, 633 N.Y.S.2d 436, 441 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1995) (stating that "the court can consider the self-interest of the partnership in
assigning an artificially low value to a departing partner's share").
101. On the other hand, the court permitted the founding partners to offset the profit share
of the withdrawing partner by his share of the firm's rental obligation under its long-term
office lease.
102. See RUPA § 103(b). For a defense of RUPA's mandatory minima, see generally
Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationship, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (Spring 1995).
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By far the most controversial of RUPA's mandatory rules are those
concerning the fiduciary duties of partners and the related obligation of good
faith and fair dealing. RUPA's rules on the fiduciary duties of partners are
mostly default rules with discrete mandatory minima. Because the drafters
intended RUPA to give partners greater flexibility to agree to limit their
fiduciary duties, the mandatory minima are extremely permissive.
RUPA's core fiduciary duty provision is section 404, which sets out the
duties that RUPA classifies as fiduciary duties together with other rights and
obligations. One must read section 404 in conjunction with section 103(b),
which explains the extent to which the section 404 and other rules may be
varied or eliminated. Section 404 also includes an overarching obligation of
good faith and fair dealing, which falls outside of section 404's definition of
fiduciary duties. Also outside of RUPA's definition of fiduciary duties are
section 403's duties to provide access to books and records and to provide
other information.
B. Nine Fiduciary Duty Rules
RUPA's fiduciary duty provisions can be stated as nine separate rules.
Rule #1: Every partner has fiduciary duties to the partnership and to the
other partners.° 3 This rule differentiates partnerships from limited liability
companies (LLCs), in which not all members have duties to other members or
to the company. In the case of manager-managed LLCs, non-managing mem-
bers have no duties to the other members or to the organization." RUPA has
one set of rules that applies to all partners, both to managing partners and to non-
managing partners, although case law puts managers under a heightened duty. °
Is there a breach of a fiduciary duty every time there is a breach within
a relationship that is categorized as a fiduciary relationship? RUPA's answer
is clearly "no." Under RUPA, partners have a wide range of duties under the
partnership agreement and under the statute. The statute makes clear that the
relationship is bifurcated. RUPA distinguishes a partner's fiduciary duties
from the partner's other duties and obligations. Very few duties are fiduciary
duties. The basic message of the statute is that partnership is a contractual
relationship in which there are limited fiduciary duties."°
103. See RUPA §§ 404(a)-(c).
104. See UNIFoRM LIMrrED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 409(h)(1), 6A U.L.A. 464
(1995) [hereinafter ULLCA] (stating that "a member who is not also a manager owes no duties
to the company or to the other members solely by reason of being a member").
105. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928). "[Salmon] was much
more than a coadventurer. He was a managing coadventurer. For him and for those like him
the rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme." Id. (citations omitted).
106. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 601-02 (Tex. App. 1995, writ
CADWALADER, RUPA AND FDUCIARYDUTY
RUPA does not make clear the significance of classifying an obligation
as a fiduciary duty. For example, assume that in Cadwalader the dominant
partners breached the partnership agreement by failing to acknowledge Mr.
Beasley's right to a liquidation. Is it important to ask whether the breach is
a violation of a fiduciary duty? Does it matter at all?
Traditionally, a contract embracing a fiduciary relationship is treated
specially. The law of agency" states that agency "is both a consensual and
a fiduciary relation."'0 8 Although the agency relation normally involves a
contract, "it is a special kind of contract, since an agent is not merely a
promisor or a promisee but is also a fiduciary." " This means that the agent's
"duties are similar to those of a testamentary trustee to the beneficiaries. " °
Any "gaps" in the contract are filled with this in mind,' and specific provi-
sions are interpreted with this in mind.1 2 Doubts are resolved against the
fiduciary."'
In addition, because of the fiduciary nature of the relation, one may
enforce the duties of an agent not only with contract remedies, but also with
tort remedies:
[U]nlike most other contracting parties, the agent may be subject to tort
liability to the principal for failing to perform his duties. If the agent...
acts disobediently causing harm to the principal's interests, an action of
tort will lie against him, as it will if he violates a duty of loyalty to the
granted) (following UPA). The appellate court reversed a punitive damage award in a
wrongful expulsion case "[b]ecause we find the firm breached the partnership agreement but
did not breach a fiduciary duty .... " Id. at 599.
107. Compare RUPA § 301 (providing that every partner is an agent of the partnership),
with ULLCA § 301(b)(1) (providing that "a member is not an agent of the company for the
purpose of its business solely by reason of being a member").
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY, Ch. 13, Topic 1, Introductory Note (1957).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY states that:
[S]ince the contract of employment, if there is one, is ordinarily not spelled out in
detail but depends for its interpretation upon evidence as to the customary way of
doing business, the generalizations which can be drawn concerning the agent's
duties are inferences of fact which are permissible only in the absence of a specific
understanding otherwise.
Id.
112. Id. "Even specific agreements, however, must be interpreted in the light of the
principles which are applicable to the relation of principal and agent." Id.
113. See Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 804 (Conn. 1994) (stating that
promises of managing general partner "were impressed with a fiduciary duty" that imposed
burden of proving fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence).
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principal by improperly competing with him or otherwise. In all of these
situations his liability extends beyond the area of contractual obligation so
that normally the principal will have a choice between maintaining an
action for a breach of contract or for a tort.
1 1 4
On the other hand, as Professor Hynes has stressed, the Restatement of
Agency is permeated with language that the agent's fiduciary duties are
"dependent upon the nonexistence of an agreement to the contrary. " '
To the extent that fiduciary obligations are more supportive of punitive
damages than other contractual obligations, characterizing the wrong can be
important." 6 Cadwalader's conclusion that an appropriation had taken place
in violation of fiduciary duties is more supportive of an award of punitive
damages than is a conclusion that the firm had overlooked a non-fiduciary
procedural nicety." 7 One can view appropriation of a partnership opportu-
nity as theft. It has on occasion been treated as a moral wrong for disciplin-
ary law"' and criminal law purposes." 9 The three basic purposes of punitive
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF AGENCY, Ch. 13, Topic 1, Introductory Note (1957).
115. J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships: The
Bargain Principle and the Law ofAgency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 446 (1997); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 376 cmt. a (1957). The RESTATEMENT notes:
[The duties.., of loyalty are inferences drawn from the conduct of the parties
in light of common experience and what reasonable men regard as fair.... Since
the parties can make what agreements they please, and since... such agreements
are enforceable, the [duty of loyalty] rules . . . are . . . dependent upon the
nonexistence of an agreement to the contrary.
Id.
116. The partners may contract with respect to dispute resolution and with respect to the
availability of punitive damages as a remedy. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995).
[O]ur decisions... make clear that if contracting parties agree to include claims
for punitive damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the [Federal Arbitration
Act] ensures that their agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if
a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration. Thus,
the case... comes down to what the contract has to say about the arbitrability of
petitioner's claim for punitive damages.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992);
Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y. 1995).
117. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. App. 1995, writ
granted) (reversing award of punitive damages "[b]ecause we find the firm breached the
partnership agreement but did not breach a fiduciary duty"); see also Heller v. Pillsbury
Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that punitive
damages are recoverable for breach of fiduciary duty but that claim requires "clear and
convincing" evidence and not merely preponderance of evidence).
118. Partners who are attorneys may be subjected to additional consequences for breach-
ing fiduciary duties, even if the breach falls outside the attorney-client relationship. In one
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damages are to assure sufficient compensation to the aggrieved individual,
to punish the wrongdoer and to deter similar wrongdoing.12 Cadwalader is
typical of many cases in which the exact purpose of the punitive damages is
unclear, 12  even though when and how judges submit punitive damage
awards to juries are critical.'
On the other hand, RUPA contains no rules that expressly bifurcate
available remedies. In addition, an analysis that requires a determination of
whether a fiduciary duty exists in order to decide choice of remedy is
excessively formalistic and fails to appreciate the overlapping nature of tort
and contract.12 The remedy issue is one aspect of RUPA's larger theme -
case, an attorney appropriated to his own use a portion of the attorneys' fees he should have
been sharing with his partners. See Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v.
McClintock, 442 N.W.2d 607, 607 (Iowa 1989). The Grievance Commission found, among
other things, that the attorney had committed "illegal conduct involving moral turpitude." Id.
The Supreme Court reprimanded the attorney, stating: "[Miost law partnerships are founded
upon a total trust and confidence among the partners. A breach of this exceedingly close
relationship merits disciplinary action. Although [his] conduct did not involve an attorney-
client relationship, his conduct is governed by the Code of Professional Responsibility." Id.
at 608.
119. See HILLMANETAL., supra note 5, at51.
An important criminal law consequence was intended to follow from the declara-
tion that the partnership as an entity, rather than the partners as co-owners, owns
partnership property. One purpose of the move was to make clear that partners
who embezzle from partnerships are subject to the same criminal penalties as
shareholders who embezzle from corporations.
Id.
120. This is also true in the case of a business organization that is being held vicariously
liable for the behavior of an agent. See Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the
Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 136 (1982). "If
punishment is the chief purpose of punitive damages, then the criminal law model should
prevail and vicarious liability should be rejected. But if deterrence is the principal purpose,
the tort law model seems controlling, and vicarious liability can be endorsed." Id.
121. Given that punishment and deterrence are different purposes, the terms "punitive"
and "exemplary" may have different meanings. Nevertheless, on occasion courts use them
interchangeably. See Jerman v. O'Leary, 701 P.2d 1205 (Ariz. 1985); Bohatch v. Butler &
Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App. 1995, writ granted).
122. In Bohatch, the jury awarded'an expelled partner $4 million in punitive damages
against three members of the firm's management committee. See Bohatch, 905 S.W.2d at
600. The trial court reduced the punitive damage award to $237,141. Id. at 601. The
intermediate appellate court eliminated them completely, reasoning that punitive damages were
inappropriate because, although the defendants breached the partnership agreement, they did
not breach any fiduciary duties. Id. at 608.
123. See Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fidu-
ciary Duty and Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955, 978-93 (1995) (discussing good
faith and fiduciary duty continuum).
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to restrain the application of the law of fiduciary duties. This is the stuff of
rules 2 and 3.
Rule #2 and Rule #3: Rule #2 states that the only fiduciary duties a
partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care that are defined in the statute.U One can best under-
stand this rule in conjunction with Rule #3, which states that a partner has
a duty of loyalty that "is limited to" the duty to account for partnership
opportunities, the duty to refrain from dealing as or on behalf of an adverse
party, and the duty to refrain from competing with the partnership prior to
dissolution."n These two rules are RUPA's most controversial provisions
and are the ones most likely to be modified by adopting states."
The basic purpose of the exclusive listing approach to fiduciary duties
is to instruct the courts: (1) refrain from creating new duties under the rubric
of fiduciary obligation; 7 (2) permit recognized fiduciary duties to be re-
stricted by agreement; and (3) treat the specified fiduciary duties, and only
these duties, as supporting tort remedies in addition to contract remedies."
As discussed below, many consider the duty of good faith and fair dealing
and the duty to provide information, neither of which appears on RUPA's
exclusive list of fiduciary duties, to be important aspects of a partner's
fiduciary duties.
124. RUPA § 404(a).
125. RUPA § 404(b).
126. California eliminated the exclusive statement aspect of Rules 2 and 3. The word
"only" was deleted from California's adoption of RUPA section 404(a) and the duty of loyalty
is not "limited to" but "includes" the components listed in RUPA section 404(b). See CAL.
CORP. CODE § 16404(a), (b) (flush language) (West 1996). In Florida, the "only" was
retained in RUPA section 404(a), but the RUPA section 404(b) duty of loyalty is stated to
include, "without limitation," the components specified in RUPA section 404(b). See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 620.8404 (West 1997).
127. Cf. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. App. 1995, writ
granted) (stating that "partners have a general fiduciary duty not to expel other partners from
the partnership in bad faith"). On the other hand, Bohatch rejected a jury finding that three
managing partners "breached a fiduciary duty 'with an intent to gain additional benefit.'" Id.
at 600 (citations omitted).
128. See Vestal, supra note 4, at 530. Professor Vestal states: "RUPA overall adopts a
much more contractarian orientation than does the UPA, although the transition is imper-
fect.... It seems clear that the fiduciary duties of partners under the UPA and common law
are matters essentially of status and not agreement, of tort and not contract." Id. But see
Hynes, supra note 115, at 452; Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorpo-
rated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 537, 538-39 (1997). Professors Hynes and Ribstein
take the opposite position. They believe that contract always has been controlling and that
RUPA has added mandatory fiduciary minima that did not exist under the UPA.
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Rule #4: A partner is not the sort of fiduciary who must behave as a
disinterested trustee. 29 Judge Cook quoted Judge Cardozo's language in
Meinhard v. Salmon,3' to the effect that "[a] trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the marketplace.""' According to Cardozo, the
"standard of behavior" for such a trustee is "[n]ot honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive. " 132 This meant that "thought of self
was to be renounced, however hard the abnegation.', 33 RUPA reflects the
judgment that it is inappropriately unrealistic to expect partners to renounce
self-interest.' 34 Section 404(e) codifies this judgment, providing that: "A
partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this act or under a part-
nership agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers the part-
ner's interest. ""
Section 404(e) is a very different statement of the law than the statement
in many judicial opinions that a partner's fiduciary duty requires abnegation
of self. It reflects developments in corporate law136 and was made part of the
statute because of the influence of the work of Professor Robert W. HiUman.
Professor Hillnan's analysis is that the courts' actions speak much more
softly than their words.3 In particular, partners may pursue self-interest by
rebargaining their relationship. The drafters of RUPA wanted statutory
statement of the pursuit of self-interest that is legitimate under current case
flaw. Inclusion of this principle reflects the policy judgment that overly
broad statements of fiduciary duty tend to invite costly and wasteful litigation
129. C. Riddlev. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (permitting joint
tenant to secretly and unilaterally sever joint tenancy). In Riddle, the joint tenants were hus-
band and wife and the severance arguably violated a contract to mutually plan their estates. Id.
130. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
131. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777, at *5 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
132. Id.
133. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928).
134. Cardozo himself thought the case law of his time offered little guidance in deciding
particular cases: "Little profit will come from a dissection of the precedents." Id. at 547.
135. RUPA § 404(e).
136. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Naked Emperor: A Corporate Lawyer Looks at
RUPA's Fiduciary Provisions, 54 WASH. &LEE L. REv. 465, 471 (1997). "[Mlost fiduciary
applications today permit some of the self-interested conduct now provided by RUPA, but
backstopped by a requirement of fairness. Fairness - and not self abnegation - is the
hallmark of the modem fiduciary." Id.
137. See generally Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1987). See also John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law
of Trsts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995) (concluding that "despite decades of pulpit-thumping
rhetoric about the sanctity of fiduciary obligations, fiduciary duties in trust law are unambigu-
ously contractarian").
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and threats of litigation,"3 including litigation by partners who are attempting
to avoid some aspect of their partnership agreement.
Rule #5: One might refer to Rule #5 as the dual capacity, or nonpartner
capacity rule. It authorizes partners to contract for the same rights as third
parties with respect to selected aspects of the partnership business.'39 Section
404(f) provides: "A partner may lend money to and transact other business
with the partnership, and as to each loan or transaction, the rights and
obligations of the partner are the same as those of a person who is not a
partner, subject to other applicable law.""4 The rule clarifies that "a partner
may, for the partner's own account, purchase the assets of the partnership
at a foreclosure sale or upon the liquidation of the partnership." 141 This
interpretation endorses case law in states such as Georgia on the narrow
point of lender remedies, 42 and also endorses case law from other states with
regard to other transactions. 3
Rule #6: Section 103(b)(3) provides that the partnership agreement may
not "eliminate" the duty of loyalty, but it "may identify specific types or
categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not mani-
festly unreasonable."'" The drafters clearly intended to prevent a categori-
cal waiver of the duty of loyalty. To this extent, the drafters saw themselves
as codifying existing law. 45
On the other hand, RUPA permits a very general ex ante restriction of
the duty of loyalty. It is clear that, except in extreme situations, the partner-
ship agreement may limit narrowly the fiduciary duties of partners" with
138. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138
U. PA. L. Rv. 1675, 1696 (1990) (approving Meinhard's "aspirational and studiously
imprecise" language).
The very ambiguity of the language conveys its moral content as the court's refusal
to set lines is designed to discourage marginal conduct by making it difficult for a
fiduciary to determine the point at which self-serving conduct will be prohibited,
and thus to encourage conduct well within the borders.
Id.
139. The Internal Revenue Code also provides that, for certain purposes, partners may
treat transactions between partnership and partner as transactions between unrelated parties.
See I.R.C. § 707 (1996).
140. RUPA § 404(f).
141. RUPA § 404 cmt. 6.
142. See Westminster Properties, Inc. v. Atlanta Assocs., 301 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (Ga.
1983).
143. Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554, 555-56 (Tenn. 1979) (including strong dissent).
144. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(i).
145. RUPA § 103 cmt. 4 (citing Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. 1989)).
146. Some partners may want to leave the default rules in place, or even strengthen them.
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respect to specific types or categories of activities. 47 The restriction need
not be transaction specific. For example, a partnership agreement may
permit a general partner in a real estate partnership to trade for the partner's
own account without prior disclosure and without offering opportunities to
the partnership.
1 48
Rule #7: RUPA provides for ex ante and ex post approval of specific
transactions: "[A]I of the parties or a number or percentage specified in the
partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all
material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the
duty of loyalty. 1 49 Even prior to RUPA, partners could authorize specific
transactions in advance. In Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky,°50 the
court allowed the general partners in a limited partnership to release them-
selves from liability on a lease to their own thinly capitalized corporation.' 5'
The court said that full disclosure in the prospectus had the effect of "exoner-
ating" the general partners "from adverse inferences" that might otherwise
have been drawn from the fact of self-dealing." Interestingly, the court did
First, some partners will want a more trusting relationship. Second, others inadvertently may
cause themselves difficulty by eliminating too much of their fiduciary obligation. For
example, in the case of a family limited partnership, eliminating the fiduciary duties of a
general partner could require the general partner to include the interest of a limited partner in
the general partner's gross estate under I.R.C. sections 2036, 2038 (1996). See Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 93-10-1039 (Mar. 12, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-15-007 (Jan. 8, 1991).
147. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33 (West 1997) (limiting covenants that restrict
competition).
148. RUPA § 103 cmt. 4. The comment explains:
A provision in a real estate partnership agreement authorizing a partner who is a
real estate agent to retain commissions on partnership property bought and sold by
that partner would be an example of a "type or category" of activity that is not
manifestly unreasonable and thus should be enforceable under the Act. Likewise,
a provision authorizing that partner to buy or sell real property for his own account
without prior disclosure to the other partners or without first offering it to the
partnership would be enforceable as a valid category of partnership activity.
Id.
149. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).
150. 223 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1966).
151. See Rivera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 223 N.E.2d 876, 880 (N.Y. 1966).
152. Id. at 880. The court stated:
Ordinarily .... self-dealing would render the defendants incapable, as general
partners .... from releasing themselves from liability on the lease .... How-
ever, partners may include in the partnership articles practically "any agreement
they wish" and, if the asserted self-dealing was actually contemplated and autho-
rized, it would not, ipsofacto, be impermissible and deemed wrongful.... [The
limited partners were fully apprised in the prospectus that the defendant general
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not require that the disclosure be in a writing designated as the partnership
agreement.1
5 3
Although at first glance the new ratification rule appears to validate
virtually all transaction-specific prior approvals and subsequent ratifications,
the drafters did not intend this interpretation. The right to approve or ratify
is subject to the obligation of good faith and fair dealing 54 and to analogous
developments in the law of other business organizations. Courts should
continue to scrutinize attempts by partners to validate their own behavior. 5
As discussed below, a more narrow interpretation of the ratification rule is
appropriate in situations like Cadwalader.
Rules #8 and #9 concern the duty of care, which is of less importance
in the Cadwalader scenario than the duty of loyalty and the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing.156
C. The Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
RUPA provides that all rights and duties are qualified by the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing. Section 404 requires a partner to "discharge
the duties to the partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under
the partnership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.""5 The partnership agreement may
not eliminate the obligation of good faith55 and fair dealing, but it "may
partners intended to lease the premises to their own [thinly capitalized] corpora-
tion .... This clear statement of purpose has the effect of "exonerating" the
defendants, at least in part, "'from adverse inferences which might otherwise be
drawn against them'" simply from the fact that they dealt with themselves.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Bassan v. Investment Exchange Corp., 524 P.2d 233, 236-37
(Wash. 1974) (suggesting that, if partner is to enter into transaction with partnership, partner
should disclose extent of profit).
153. RUPA section 101(5) defines the partnership agreement to be the entire understand-
ing among the partners, "whether written, oral, or implied," not including nonpartner capacity
understandings, such as leases or mortgages. See RUPA § 101 cmt.
154. See RUPA § 404 cmt. 4.
155. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing application of ratification rule in situations like
Cadwalader).
156. The fact that most strongly suggests a duty of care issue is the failure to consult
the firm's partnership experts. The RUPA standard is the duty to refrain from gross negli-
gence. RUPA § 404(c). The agreement may not "unreasonably reduce" this duty. RUPA
§ 103(b)(4); see Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform
Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAw. 427, 468 (1991).
157. RUPA § 404(d).
158. Professor Hynes believes that RUPA's definition of good faith is too broad for a
mandatory rule:
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prescribe the standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be
measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.""5 9
The basic purpose of RUPA's "obligation" of good faith and fair
dealing rather than a "duty" of good faith and fair dealing is to assure that
no new duties, fiduciary or otherwise, are created under the general rubric
of good faith (with or without fair dealing). RUPA provides that "[t]he obli-
gation of good faith and fair dealing... is not.., a separate and independ-
ent obligation. It is an ancillary obligation that applies whenever a partner
discharges a duty or exercises a right under the partnership agreement or the
Act."to160
By statutory fiat, the "obligation of good faith and fair dealing" is not
a fiduciary duty. Presumably this means that the "obligation" is merely
contractual. It is true that longstanding authority suggests that good faith and
fair dealing is a contractual duty. 161  On the other hand, a considerable
amount of case law exists that discusses good faith and fair dealing as a
fiduciary duty. 62 Case law also exists that discusses it as both.163
A broad definition of good faith as a default duty is one thing; a broad definition
of a mandatory term is quite another. It creates a risk of litigation over difficult
decisions that may involve conflicting interests, and it can be exploited by a partner
disappointed in the relationship who takes advantage of ambiguity and complexity
and generates a dispute by claiming fellow partners acted in bad faith.
Hynes, supra note 115, at 450 n.47.
159. RUPA § 103(b)(5).
160. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4.
161. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oFCoNTRAcrs § 205 (1979) (stating "[e]very contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement"); see also Oregon RSA No. 6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Oregon L.P., 840
F. Supp. 770, 778 (D. Or. 1993), af4'd, 76 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1996). "liThe doctrine of
good faith is not a new material term created by the court, but rather a term implied by law
in every contract to give effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties that were created
by the language of their contract." Id.
162. See Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
"[Tihe fiduciary duty owed between partners... requires each to exercise good faith and fair
dealing in partnership transactions and toward co-partners." Id.; see also Exxon Corp. v.
Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1299 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that "the contractual abrogation of some
fiduciary duties does not relieve the general partner from other basic fiduciary duties, such as
the duty of good faith and fair dealing" (citations omitted)). RUPA provides a similar
mandatory minimum for the non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing as it does
for the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Compare RUPA § 103(b)(3)(i) (providing that partners may
draft out of duty of loyalty specific types or categories of activities "if not manifestly unrea-
sonable"), with RUPA § 103(b)(5) (providing that performance standards may define what
falls outside obligation of good faith and fair dealing, "if... not manifestly unreasonable").
163. See Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1265, 1271 (Mass. 1995). The court noted:
"Partners owe each other a fiduciary duty of the highest degree of good faith and fair deal-
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It is clear enough how the obligation interacts with the duties RUPA
considers contractual. It is not at all clear how it interacts with the duties
RUPA classifies as fiduciary. For example, what does it mean to say that
there is "merely" a contractual obligation to use good faith and fair dealing
to carry out the fiduciary duty of loyalty? Does this mean that tort remedies
are appropriate if one violates the black-letter of the duty but inappropriate
if one violates the interstitial "obligation"? Presumably, the obligation takes
on the nature of the underlying right or duty. If the obligation qualifies a
fiduciary duty, it takes on the nature of a fiduciary obligation, and tort
remedies are appropriate. If it qualifies a right or a duty that is merely
contractual, tort remedies are not appropriate.
RUPA states that there is no "firmly fixed" meaning of good faith and
fair dealing: "'Good faith' clearly suggests a subjective element, while 'fair
dealing' implies an objective component. It was decided to leave the terms
undefined in the Act and allow the courts to develop their meaning ....
The Comments to RUPA state that good faith is an "excluder" that has no
general meaning of its own.16 They also state that the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing includes a disclosure component that supplements the
RUPA section 403 duty to furnish information.'"
D. Information Rights
RUPA's definition of the fiduciary duties of partners is underinclusive
to the extent that it does not include the duty to provide information. Courts
ing.... The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual obligation." Id.
164. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4. The drafters rejected the UCC definitions of good faith: "The
UCC definition of 'good faith' is honesty in fact and, in the case of a merchant, the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. Those definitions were
rejected as too narrow or not applicable." Id. (citations omitted). With respect to the
objective and subjective aspects, see Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 995 F.2d 1422, 1431 (8th Cir. 1993). The court noted that "even drafters of the U.C.C.
have believed that the U.C.C.'s definition of good faith contains both objective and subjective
components and that, at any rate, the difference between 'subjective' and 'objective' standards
is often minimal in practice." Id.
165. See RUPA § 404 cmt. 4.
Good faith . . . is best understood as an "excluder" - a phrase with no general
meaning or meanings of its own. Instead, it functions to rule out many different
forms of bad faith. It is hard to get this point across to persons used to thinking that
every word must have one or more general meanings of its own - must be either
univocal or ambiguous.
Id.
166. See id. "In some situations the obligation of good faith includes a disclosure com-
ponent. Depending on the circumstances, a partner may have an affirmative disclosure
obligation that supplements the Section 403 duty to render information." Id.
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and commentators have long considered the duty to provide information to
be an important aspect of a partner's fiduciary duties,'67 although the UPA
did not expressly designate it as a fiduciary duty. 6s
Ironically, even though RUPA does not recognize the duty to provide
information as a "fiduciary" duty, it makes the duty stronger than it was
under the UPA. 169 Indeed, the one area in which RUPA has expanded what
courts traditionally considered fiduciary obligation has been in information
rights. Section 403 provides:
(b) A partnership shall provide partners... access to its books and records ....
(c) Each partner and the partnership shallfurnish to a partner...
(1) without demand, any information concerning the partnership's business
and affairs reasonably requiredfor the proper exercise of the partner's rights and
duties under the partnership agreement or this [Act]; and
(2) on demand, any other information concerning the partnership's business
and affairs, except to the extent the demand... is unreasonable or otherwise
improper under the circumstances. 7
167. Because the duty to provide information often has been considered a core fiduciary
duty, the kind of non-uniform provisions that are being enacted with respect to fiduciary duties
also can be expected with respect to information duties. For example, Florida law states that
the partnership agreement may not "[u]nreasonably restrict the right of access to books and
records under section 620.8403(2) and (3)." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.8103(2)(a)(2) (West
1997). The words of section 620.8103(2)(a)(2) refer only to the right of access to books and
records but the numerical references of section 620.8103(2)(a)(2) include specific references
both to subsection (2), dealing with books and records, and to subsection (3), dealing with the
duty to furnish "any information," upon demand and without demand. Id. Stated differently,
under Florida's version of RUPA, partnerships may not unreasonably restrict the duty to
disclose without demand.
168. Compare UPA § 20, with UPA § 21.
169. The duty is stronger with respect to the partnership and with respect to other
partners. RUPA is stingy with information rights for transferees. See RUPA § 503(a)(3).
RUPA provides that a transfer of a partner's transferable interest in the partnership "does
not... entitle the transferee, during the continuance of the partnership, to... require access
to information concerning or an account of partnership transactions, or to inspect or copy the
partnership books or records." Id.; see Bauer v. The Bloomfield Co./Holden Joint Venture,
849 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1993); LARRY E. RM.TEIN, UNINCORaORATED BUsINESS ENTreEs 134
(1996). Professor Ribstein states:
The assignee relies, in effect, on her contract with the assignor partner, who may
agree to exercise her own rights on behalf of the assignee. Even if the assignor does
not explicitly agree to protect the assignee, a court might hold that such a duty is
implicit in an assignment of economic rights, since the rights would be worthless
without it.
Id. But see TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 27(1) (West 1970) (providing that
assignee is entitled "for any proper purpose, to require reasonable information or account of
partnership transactions and to make reasonable inspection of the partnership books").
170. RUPA § 403 (emphasis added).
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (1997)
The big change in section 403 is the elimination of the need to make a
demand for information. Because section 403 states a duty to provide
information "without demand," it constitutes a powerful new affirmative duty
to disclose. Both sides in Cadwalader could have argued that the other side
should have furnished.information necessary for the proper exercise of their
rights and duties.
Although RUPA prohibits a partnership agreement from unreasonably
restricting the section 403(b) right of access to books and records,"' it
permits the partnership agreement to eliminate the section 403(c) information
rights.172 On one hand, the right to withhold information is subject to the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing, leaving the courts a statutory basis
for imposing minimal disclosure obligations. On the other hand, the drafters
did not intend RUPA's "obligation" of good faith and fair dealing to be a
talisman for creating new rights or duties.
IV. Cadwalader Revisited Under RUPA
A. RUPA's Basic Policies Are Unchanged
RUPA does little to change the result in Cadwalader, either by its
fiduciary duty and related rules or by its rules on partnership breakups.
Although RUPA uses language of contract to restrict fiduciary duties, it
reflects the substance of holdings under the UPA that partners have great
freedom to define their relationship. 73 A rich body of case law has devel-
oped around the general notion that partners are fiduciaries. Much of it
antedated the use of the word fiduciary in the title to UPA section 21.
Indeed, it is not clear that the UPA had any significant influence on the
development of the law of partners as fiduciaries. Courts will import whole-
sale much of the UPA case law into the interpretation of RUPA, and corpo-
rate law will continue to provide useful analogies. Courts may restate much
of this law in terms of the section 404(d) obligation of good faith and fair
dealing.
RUPA contains new rules to clarify the winding down of a partner's
fiduciary duties. These rules distinguish among the components of the duty
of loyalty. Dissociation terminates a partner's duty to refrain from compet-
ing with the partnership." The duty to account for benefits and opportuni-
171. RUPA § 103(b)(2).
172. Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1299 (5th Cir. 1993) (permitting
contracting-out of disclosure obligations by sophisticated parties in negotiated transaction).
173. See Ribstein, supra note 128, for an analysis of the UPA case law approving
contracting-out of fiduciary duties.
174. RUPA §§ 603(b)(2), 404(b)(3).
912
CADWALADER, RUPA AND FIDUCIARYDUTY
ties continues, as does the duty to refrain from dealing as or on behalf of an
adverse party, but "only with regard to matters arising and events occurring
before the partner's dissociation, unless the partner participates in the
winding up of the business .... ",75 Although these provisions raise ques-
tions of interpretation, 7 6 the drafters did not intend to change current law."n
Under RUPA, as under the UPA, partners in Cadwalader-type situations are
under a fiduciary duty to refrain from appropriating opportunities and owe
an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in winding up.
Although RUPA contains extensive new provisions on partnership
breakups, much of the traditional analysis continues. Each partner has the
power to dissociate at any time. 78 The partnership agreement may provide
for summary expulsions.'79 Although RUPA continues to provide for expul-
sion pursuant to the partnership agreement, "0 it also provides for expulsion
by decree." Unlike under the UPA, an expulsion causes a dissociation that
does not in itself cause a dissolution," and the new buyout rules apply to
pay back the expelled partner.
RUPA's fiduciary duty and breakup rules interact to continue the rule
that conduct that does not constitute an effective expulsion pursuant to
agreement may nevertheless cause a rightful dissolution.'8 3 In addition,
despite considerable opposition, RUPA continues the rule that each partner
has the right to liquidate the business of an at-will partnership." Absent a
continuation agreement, a dissociating partner may call for liquidation of the
partnership assets, satisfaction of all liabilities and distribution of any surplus
175. RUPA § 603(3). The duty of care also continues only with respect to these matters
and events.
176. For example, it is not clear how to reconcile the statement that the duty to compete
terminates with the statement that the duty to refrain from dealing as an adverse party
continues.
177. See RUPA § 603 cmt. 2. "No change from current law is intended." Id.
178. See RUPA § 602(a). "A partner has the power to dissociate at any time, rightfully
or wrongfully, by express will pursuant to Section 601(1)." Id.
179. See RUPA § 601 cmt. 4. "The expulsion can be with or without cause. Asunder
existing law, the obligation of good faith under Section 404(d) does not require prior notice,
specification of cause, or an opportunity to be heard." Id.
180. RUPA § 601(3). It also provides for expulsion by unanimous vote of the other
partners in a very limited class of situations. RUPA § 601(4).
181. RUPA § 601(5). RUPA provides that the partnership agreement may not "vary the
right of a court to expel a partner in the events specified in section 601(5)." RUPA
§ 103(b)(7).
182. Compare RUPA § 601, with RUPA § 801.
183. See RUPA §§ 202, 601, 602(b), 801, 802(a).
184. RUPA § 801(1).
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in cash." Furthermore, each non-wrongful dissolver has the right to
participate in the control of the winding up." These are the concepts Judge
Cook did not explore under the UPA. There is no reason to believe he
would have explored them under RUPA.
Despite the fact that RUPA does little to change basic policy, there are
two aspects of RUPA that require special mention in Cadwalader situations.
The first is RUPA's new rule that specifically authorizes the ratification of
acts that would otherwise breach fiduciary duties. The second is RUPA's
new definition of wrongful dissociation.
B. Amendment and Ratification
Given Judge Cook's language of moral indignation and the conclusion
implicit in his punitive damage award that some very bad behavior took
place, it is remarkable that he also said that the management committee could
have accomplished its goal simply by amending the partnership agreement
to permit expulsion: "There was a way for [Cadwalader] to address the
problem of profitability and the presence of too many unproductive
partners .... That was to present the problem to the partnership with a
proposed amendment to the partnership agreement providing for the expul-
sion of partners.""s
The court's suggestion that the partnership agreement could have been
amended... to permit expulsion raises two fundamental questions. The first
is whether the partnership can ever add an expulsion provision over the
objection of a partner to whom it will be applied. The second is whether
interested partners may vote to ratify their own wrongs.
185. RUPA § 807(a).
186. RUPA § 803(a).
187. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777 at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996).
188. It is not clear why Judge Cook did not consider the 67-12 vote approving the
reduction in the number of partners an amendment and expulsion. Was it because there was
no express amendment of the partnership agreement? Was it because a 67-12 vote would have
been insufficient for an amendment? Was it because the word "expulsion" was not used? The
partners appear to have voted to approve the shut down of the Palm Beach office and the
elimination of other partners. Would the actions with respect to Mr. Beasley have been
approved by Judge Cook if the partners had voted instead for the following resolutions:
(1) resolved that the closing of the Palm Beach office is the equivalent of an expulsion;
(2) resolved that the partnership agreement is hereby amended to permit expulsion by the
management committee or by a vote of a majority of partners; and (3) resolved that, in
accordance with the amended partnership agreement, Palm Beach partners not assigned to
other offices are hereby expelled? This appears to be the substance of what transpired without
the use of the words "amendment" or "expulsion."
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1. Subsequent Amendment to Authorize Expulsion
In general, partners cannot modify a partnership agreement withoutunanimous consent." 9 However, because this is a default rule rather than a
mandatory rule,' 9 a partnership agreement can authorize amendment by less
than unanimous consent. There is authority for the proposition that a general
provision for amendment includes amendments that authorize the expulsion
of existing and objecting partners.' 9'
In Aztec Petroleum Corp. v. MHM Co.,'92 limited partners removed a
general partner by amending the partnership agreement."9 The original
partnership agreement contained no provision for the removal of a general
partner. However, it contained a general provision that authorized an
extraordinary majority of the limited partners to amend the partnership
agreement. The requisite number of limited partners voted to amend the
partnership agreement to provide for the removal of the general partner and
for the conversion of the removed partner's interest to that of a limited
partner. After the partners approved the amendment, the limited partners
removed the general partner.
The court held that the law does not require the general partner's
"consent to its own replacement." The court sustained a summary judgment
against the removed partner, stating that, as a matter of law, a general
provision authorizing amendment includes an amendment adding a removal
clause:
[N]either the partnership act nor the limited partnership act prohibit remov-
al and substitution of a general partner in a limited partnership, even though
the partnership agreement initially does not directly allow such action, if the
partnership agreement provides a method for amendment and an amend-
ment permitting substitution and removal of a general partner is adopted.'9'
189. RUPA § 4010).
190. RUPA § 103(a).
191. C. HLLMAN, supra note 23, § 5.3.2.
An expulsion by act of partners requires a preexisting agreement specifically
authorizing the removal of partners. Absent such an agreement, an expulsion may
not be accomplished without the unanimous consent of the partners; such consent
would effectively be given for amending the partnership agreement to allow expul-
sions, a circumstance unlikely to occur since the target of the expulsion action would
need to approve the amendment.
Id.
192. 703 S.W.2d 290 ('rex. App. 1985).
193. See Aztec Petroleum Corp. v. MHM Co., 703 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex. App. 1985,
no writ).
194. Id. at 293.
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The court also rejected the argument that general partner status is such a
"fundamental element of the agreement" that, as a matter of contract law, the
partners cannot change it without unanimous consent. The court said that
"any unanimity which may be required by contract law was met when all
parties to the partnership agreement consented to be bound by amendments
passed" by an extraordinary majority.1 9
Aztec is distinguishable from Cadwalader in two important ways. First,
Aztec involved a removal of a general partner by limited partners, who,
unlike general partners, typically have no right to take part in the control of
the partnership. Nor do they usually have the exit rights of a general part-
ner. The only remedy many limited partners have is the right to select a
general partner. Second, the partners demoted the general partner in Aztec
to limited partner, rather than forcing him out of the partnership, and thus
they did not extinguish his continuing economic interest in the business.
A court might view the addition of a clause authorizing complete
expulsion as too fundamental a change to be made over the objection of a
partner to whom it might apply.196 On the other hand, particularly in part-
nerships with strong centralized decisionmaking, the addition of an expulsion
clause under a general power to amend may be perfectly consistent with the
relationship."
195. Id. at 294. "Having agreed to a contract which contained a mechanism for amend-
ment upon approval of seventy percent of the partnership units, we conclude that [the removed
general partner] cannot now create an exception for what it deems to be a fundamental element
of the contract." Id.
196. See McCallum v. Asbury, 393 P.2d 774, 775-76 (Or. 1964). "Fundamental changes
in a partnership agreement may not be made without the consent of all the parties. This is true
even though the agreement may provide that it can be amended by majority vote." Id. On the
other hand, McCallum held that it was permissible to amend the partnership agreement to
create an executive committee and to give it management authority, subject to veto by a
majority of partners within ten days: "We hold that these limitations upon the committee's
powers kept the delegation well within the scope and intent of the original partnership
agreement." Id. at 776; see also ALLAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG
AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 6:48 (1996). Bromberg and Ribstein note:
Although it is clear that, despite the dictum in McCallum, even "fundamental" acts
may be permitted over a partner's objection under an explicit provision in the
partnership agreement, the McCallum dictum is significant as a warning that a
court might strike down a majority-approved action that, although permitted by the
express terms of the agreement, results in significant revision of a partner's rights.
The court might rely on such facts as the weak bargaining position of the partner,
the partner's lack of notice of the provision, significant damage suffered by the
objecting partner, or an ulterior motive of the majority.
Id.
197. See Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 992-93 (D.D.C. 1975), "ff'd sub
nom. Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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2. Ratification by Interested Partners
More fundamentally, it is unclear as a matter of policy why it would be
appropriate to amend the partnership agreement to authorize the expulsion
Judge Cook found so offensive. He treated the case as if it had involved the
intentional appropriation of a partnership opportunity. On that assumption,
the correctness of which I have questioned, it seems improper to permit the
appropriating partners to vote to ratify their own conduct.
At first blush, RUPA provides specific statutory support for Judge
Cook's dictum that the offending partners could have ratified the appropria-
tion. Under RUPA, the duty to refrain from appropriating a partnership
opportunity is part of the section 404(b) duty of loyalty. Section
103(b) provides that, although the partner may not "eliminate" the duty of
loyalty, "all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the
partnership agreement may ... ratify, after full disclosure of all material
facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of
loyalty.""19 Does this mean that, under RUPA, Cadwalader's behavior
would not be actionable because the "percentage specified in the partnership
agreement [did] ratify a specific act [the constructive expulsion of Mr.
Beasley] that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty"?
The fundamental question presented by Judge Cook's view of the facts
is whether partners who appropriate a partnership opportunity may vote to
ratify the appropriation. Assume that Good, Bad and Ugly own and operate
a three-person partnership to invest in real estate. Assume the partnership
agreement states that all partnership decisions can be made by a two-thirds
vote. Good discovers that Bad and Ugly have just purchased for their own
account a property on which the partnership had submitted a bid. May Bad
and Ugly vote, over Good's objection, to "ratify" their "specific act" which
"otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty"?
There are several ways to explain the conclusion that Bad and Ugly may
not ratify their own appropriation of a partnership opportunity. One way is
to interpret the partnership agreement to deny relief to Bad and Ugly. One
should interpret the partnership agreement in a manner consistent with the
duty of loyalty and with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Unless
there is a clear indication to the contrary, one should not interpret the
partnership agreement to permit an appropriation of a partnership opportu-
nity. 199
198. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(ii).
199. See generally Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (enforcing
partnership agreement that said that partners could pursue opportunities as if partnership did
not exist).
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It is true that the drafters intended the ratification rule to embrace
conduct that might be considered manifestly unreasonable. Although neither
categorical waivers of the duty of loyalty nor performance standards for the
duty of good faith and fair dealing may be "manifestly unreasonable, "m
RUPA's ratification rule has no "manifestly unreasonable" limitation. The
Official Comments of RUPA make clear that the ratification rule "can...
be used to validate conduct that might otherwise not satisfy the 'manifestly
unreasonable' standard."'" Nevertheless, the drafters did not intend the
ratification rule to let Bad and Ugly do the ratifying.
The drafters did not intend the ratification rule to authorize partners to
ratify their own wrongs. They intended the ratification rule to authorize
innocent partners to ratify the wrongs of others. The Official Comments
make this point clear by referring to consent by "the other partners" 2°2 and
to consent by "the remaining partners. "2 The essence of the ratification
rule is a waiver of legal remedy by aggrieved partners:
Subsection (b)(3)(ii) is intended to clarify the right ofpartners... to
consent to a known past... violation of duty and to waive their legal
remedies for redress of that violation. This is intended to cover situations
where the conduct in question is not specifically authorized by the partner-
ship agreement.2°
Therefore, the rule permits aggrieved or innocent partners to waive their
claims, even if the offending conduct is manifestly unreasonable, provided
there is full disclosure. This is consistent with general law enforcing in-
formed waivers of the right to sue.
There is nothing in RUPA or in its history that insulates interested part-
ners who attempt to ratify their own wrongs. Nor is there anything in RUPA
that reverses UPA authority subjecting self-interested behavior to special
scrutiny' or that invalidates analogies to corporate law to the same effect.'
200. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(i).
201. RUPA § 103 cmt. 5.
202. RUPA § 404 cmt. 2. "As under UPA Section 21, the other partners may also consent
to a specific act or transaction that otherwise violates one of the rules." Id. (emphasis added).
203. RUPA § 103 cmt. 4. That comment states: "/7he remaining partners can 'consent'
to a particular conflicting interest transaction or other breach of duty, after the fact, provided
there is full disclosure." Id. (emphasis added).
204. RUPA § 103 cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
205. See Konover Dee. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 810 (Conn. 1973). "Proof of a
fiduciary relationship imposes a twofold burden on the fiduciary. First, the burden of [proving
fair dealing] shifts to the fiduciary; and second, the standard of proof is clear and convincing
evidence." Id.; see also Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1995).
206. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (stating that, when
parent corporation receives benefit from subsidiary to exclusion of, and detriment to, minority
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One statutory basis for applying corporate analogies is section 104(a),
which provides: "Unless displaced by particular provisions of this [Act], the
principles of law and equity supplement this [Act]."7 The Official Com-
ments state: "These supplementary principles encompass not only the law of
agency and estoppel, . . . but all of the other principles listed in UCC
Section 1-103; the law relating to capacity to contract, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other common law validat-
ing or invalidating causes, such as unconscionability."m Although one could
view "particular provisions" of RUPA as displacing some of the common
law of fiduciary duties,' none of RUPA's provisions authorize interested
partners to ratify their own wrongs.
Another statutory basis for applying corporate analogies is the obliga-
tion of good faith and fair dealing. The obligation "applies whenever a
partner discharges a duty or exercises a right under the partnership agree-
ment or the Act, "210 including the ratification right. -The drafters intended
that this broad contractual notion inform all partnership rights and duties,
enriching rather than restricting partnership doctrine.
C. Wrongful Dissociation
Cadwalader's suggestion that dissociations are "wrongful" whenever
they are unauthorized must be qualified in light of RUPA. "Wrongful
dissociation" is a term of art under RUPA. Section 602(b) provides that a
partner's dissociation is wrongful only if: (a) "in the case of a term partner-
ship, there is a premature withdrawal;" or (b) "it is in breach of an express
provision in the partnership agreement. "211 If a dissociation is wrongful,
shareholders of subsidiary, burden is on parent to demonstrate intrinsic fairness). If the parent
"usurped no business opportunity belonging to [the subsidiary]," the business judgment rule,
rather than the intrinsic firness requirement, applies. Id. at 722; see also Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976) (stating that stockholders in close
corporation owe one another substantially same fiduciary duty as partners). Under Wilkes, if
minority shareholders of a closely-held corporation allege "a breach of the strict good faith duty
owed them by the majority.... [Qt must be asked whether the controlling group can demonstrate
a legitimate business purpose for its action." Id. at 663. If the majority demonstrates a legiti-
mate business purpose, the burden shifts to the minority to show that it could have been achieved
with less harmful means.
207. RUPA § 104(a).
208. RUPA § 104 cmt.
209. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 37. "RUPA does attempt displacement of some
common-law rules which coexisted with the Uniform Partnership Act, most notably in the area
of the fiduciary duties of the partners iner se." Id.
210. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4.
211. RUPA § 602(b).
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there are two basic consequences: (1) the wrongful dissociator is liable for
damages caused by the wrongful dissociation; and (2) if the dissociation
leads to a dissolution, which it does in the absence of a continuation agree-
ment, the wrongful dissociator may not participate in the winding up of the
partnership business.213 Furthermore, in a term partnership, the surviving
partnership need not pay the wrongful dissociator the buyout price until the
term ends.214
Despite the fact that language of wrongful dissociation might initially
appear applicable to Cadwalader, there are two reasons it does not, even
under Judge Cook's view of the case. First, Cadwalader apparently did not
involve either a term partnership or a breach of an express provision of the
partnership agreement. Under RUPA, neither breach of an implied provi-
sion nor breach of a statutory duty or obligation renders a dissociation
wrongful. For example, a dissociation is not "wrongful" simply because it
violates the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Second, and
more importantly, section 602(b) does not address the improper dissociation
of another; rather, it addresses improper dissociation of oneself. Although
the statutory language does not make the point obvious, one does
not "wrongfully" dissociate another within the meaning of section 602.
V. Conclusion
RUPA's provisions convey the basic lesson of decades of case law that
partners have enormous freedom to define their own relationship. Judge
Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard is the typical American starting point for a
study of case law on the fiduciary duty of partners. Unfortunately, it is all
too often also the finishing line. Although the opinion sets a high moral
tone, by its own terms one of "uncompromising rigidity," Meinhard says
nothing about the flexibility partners have to define their own relationships.
It addresses only the duty to share information about a partnership opportu-
nity in the absence of an agreement defining or restricting the duty.
RUPA codifies the lessons of decades of decisions after Meinhard.
Subsequent case law contains at least four separate principles that combine
to give partners great flexibility in setting their own rules: (1) partners are
free to restrict the scope of their business relationship; (2) the fiduciary
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duties of partners do not require them to be selfless; (3) partners may agree
to limit their fiduciary duties to just short of the vanishing point; and (4) in
an at-will partnership, partners have both the power and the right to end the
relationship at any time, even for a selfish reason, provided they do not
appropriate an asset or violate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
RUPA does not change the basic analysis of situations like Cadwalader.
An enormous edifice of case law has been constructed on and around the use
of the word "fiduciary" in the title to UPA section 21. Courts and commen-
tators are likely to move that edifice to the site of RUPA section 404, placing
two corners on the duties classified as fiduciary and two corners on the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
Under RUPA, the basic measure of partner conduct remains the expec-
tation of the partners in the relationship they have created. In particular,
their expectations with respect to dissociation are of supreme importance.
If those expectations are not clear, RUPA controls. Although RUPA con-
tains a far more detailed statement of the rights of dissociating partners than
the UPA, the fundamental dissociation analysis continues. Partners in firms
without continuation agreements may dissolve at will, but they must account
to their partners in the process of winding up. It is this analysis that was
slighted in Cadwalader, both by the dominant partners and by the court.

